This paper presents a discussion of the operator/ instrumentation interactions which had an effect on the course of the incident at the Three Mile Island-2 Nuclear Power Plant. In the paper a brief review of the sequence of occurrences at TMI-2 over the first 16 hours of the incident is given with particular emphasis on operator/instrumentation interactions. A breakdown of the six major items that seemed to have contributed to the characteristics of the incident is then given and also an outline of soume of the currently proposed operator/instrumentation improvements. The six major items involve water level indication in the reactor, electromatic relief valve operation, auxiliary feedwater flow indication, containment isolation, extended range instrumentation, and computer readout.
Introduction
On March 28, 1979, at 0400, a feedwater trip occurred at the Three Mile Island-2 (TMI-2) Nuclear Power Plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania[l,2,3,4].
During the next 16 hours substantial damage was done to the reactor core, and although there was no significant injury to the public, the accident seriously damaged the reactor and has had a profound impact on the future of nuclear power in this country. I plan on reviewing a number of the operator/instrumentation interactions which contributed to the course of this incident with the view that improvements are and will be made to prevent similar occurrences at nuclear power plants in the future. The incident itself was caused by operator, design, and equipment failures and I will be stressing the operator/instrumentation aspects of the incident.
Before reviewing the course of the incident, some history on the TMI-2 Nuclear Power Plant is needed. TMI-2 is a Babcock and Wilcox Company designed pressurized water reactor (PWR). It Like other PWR's, TMI-2 has no boiling in the reactor core. The reactor coolant system (RCS) is comprisedof two closed loops through which water is pumped up through the reactor core to pick up the heat from the fission process. This heat is transported from the core through hot legs to each OTSG where it is transferred to a working fluid circulating in a second pair of loops. The working fluid drives a conventional turbine-condenser system. After giving up its heat in the OTSG's the reactor coolant is returned to the core through two cold legs by two reactor coolants pumps per loop. Figure 1 is Forced cooling with liquid is required to keep this cladding from over heating even after shutdown of the fission process. It was the reaction of water with the zirconium clad that lead to the hydrogen generation at TMI-2.
Review of Incident
The incident started with a feedwater trip. Subsequently, it took the operating crew 16 hours to achieve a stable condition. Hydrogen evolution became a major concern and itwas several days before the major danger was over. Several more weeks went by before natural circulation conditions were achieved and reactor cleanup is still underway. I will be concentrating in this paper on events which occurred during the first 16 hours. This is when the core damage occurred.
First 2.5 Hours
The trip of the feedwater pumps caused the turbine to trip resulting in a pressure rise in the reactor coolant system (RCS). This pressure rise caused the electromatic relief valve (ERV) on top of the pressurizer to open releasing steam to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT). This set of occurrences is expected to occur following a feedwater trip.
Following the opening of the ERV the reactor tripped causing the pressure to drop in the RCS. When the pressure dropped below the ERV set point, the valve did not close. This was an equipment failure. More than two hours passed before the operator noticed that the ERV was stuck open, in effect, creating a small loss of coolant accident during that time period. Failure of the operator to detect the open ERV was an operator/instrumentation failure. The console demand signal indicated that the ERV was closed and a history of past leakage lead the operator to disregard the high temperature readings in the ERV tail pipe. These, among other things, were the cause of the slow response of the operator to the failure of the ERV.
Following the reactor trip, the auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically turned on but, unknown to the operator, the flow was blocked by closed valves on the pump discharge lines. The auxiliary feedwater system is the backup system that supplies water to the steam side of the OTSG's given a loss of main feedwater and without auxiliary feedwater flow the steam generators boiled dry in a few minutes. Lights on the console indicated that these valves were closed, but this was not noted for eight minutes.
With the ERV stuck open, there was a rapid insurge into the pressurizer leading the operators to think that the reactor coolant system was full. Operator training procedures emphasize the fact that the pressurizer should not be allowed to go solid or overpressurization of the RCS might result. Forthis reason, the operators disregarded the low RCS pressure and relied on the pressurizer level to indicate that the RCS was full of water. Low pressure in the RCS caused actuation of the high pressure back-up cooling system but injection was terminated because the level readings on the pressurizer indicated that the RCS was full. The operators had been trained to stop injection from this system as soon as possible following such a transient to prevent sodium hydroxide injection into the RCS. Indeed such a NaOH injection had happened previously in a similar transient at TMI-2.
At eight minutes into the incident, the operators discovered the closed auxiliary feedwater valves and opened them commencing flow into the steam generators. At 15 minutes into the incident, the RCDT ruptured because of the collected discharge from the stuckopen ERV. This caused an increase in containment pressure. 
Efforts to Establish Stable Conditions
For the next 14 hours, the operating staff attempted to establish either forced or natural ci-rculation cooling, finally, establishing forced circulation through one loop. During this period, a hydrogen explosion occurred in the containment resulting in a 28 psig pressure spike and actuation of the containment spray system. The hydrogen explosion was not recognized by the operating staff as such at the time. They thought that the core sprays came on because of electrical problems or ERV operation. Failure to note that there was a large inventory of hydrogen in the reactor and the containment made the stablization of the transient more protracted.
During this period, several other operator/instrumentation problems can be noted. The containment sump pump automatically came on several hours into the incident and transferred radioactive water from the containment floor to the auxiliary building. Alsothere were difficulties in obtaining samples of RCS water and this lead to the contamination and evacuation of the emergency control center which had been set up near the control room. This sampling difficulty and the high background radiation levels from the released noble gases prevented the operating crew from making an early identification of the types and quantities of the fission products which had been released. Fig. 2 Table 1 , we have listed six major operator/ instrumentation interaction problems. We will now discuss each of these individually. Several proposed solutions have been suggested. As an initial attempt to provide a better indication of core water level existing plant instrumentation can be used to detect core-voiding, e.g. core exit thermocouples, cold and hot leg resistant temperature detectors (RTD), in-core and ex-core neutron detectors, and coolant saturation meters. The thermocouples and RTD'S would, along with pressure readings, give an indication of saturated conditions. The in-core and ex-core neutron detectors would give an indication of lowered water level by an increase in their counting rates.
Additional assurance of at least an indirect water level indication would be gained by placing the existing pressurizer instrumentation on the emergency power buses to assure a reliable power supply. In During the TMI-2 incident, many of the temperature and radiation instruments wentoff scale. It will be necessary to provide instrumentation with extended ranges and shielded in such a manner that accurate readings can be provided to the operators under accident condi tions.
Other instrumentation improvements are being and will be proposed. Typical are such things as hydrogen concentration meters, containment pressure instrumentation, and containment water level instrumentation. We have only attempted to address some of the more major concerns. As thinking turns towards the accident type situations, further improvements will result.
Concl us ions
A number of conclusions can be reached when reviewing the history of the TMI-2 accident. A few that have become apparent are:
Operator training and instrumentation were not sufficient to provide the operator with enough information to properly diagnose the incident.
Failure of the operator/instrumentation interface was a major contributor to the resulting core damage.
Improvements in operator/instrumentation interactions to specifically address accident situations are required.
